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Lions, Bylaws, and Conservation 
Metrics
MONIQUE BORGERHOFF MULDER, JONATHAN LUCAS KWIYEGA, SIMONE BECCARIA, SYLVESTER SADOCK BWASAMA, 
EMILY FITZHERBERT, PETER GENDA, AND TIM CARO
African lions are a significant threat to pastoralists, triggering both retaliatory and nonretaliatory killings that represent a high-profile example 
of human–wildlife conflict. In the present article, we report on a grassroots campaign to reduce such conflict by shifting agropastoralists’ attitudes 
toward lion killing and the central role of bylaws in its apparent success. Insofar as all of East Africa’s principal protected areas still harboring 
lions are surrounded by pastoralist populations, the vast majority of which persecute lions, this novel strategy is of considerable wide-scale and 
practical significance. We report on an estimated 59%–69% reduction in the number of lions killed since the implementation of bylaws and 
use our experiences to highlight the need for fresh dialog among project managers, conservation organizations, and their funders in crafting 
appropriate conservation success metrics. In the context of human–wildlife conflict, changes in peoples’ norms and attitudes are of greater 
significance over the long term than simplistic tabulations of the number of individuals saved.
Keywords: community, Katavi, Tanzania, donors, felidae
Growing agricultural and pastoral populations moving   in search of unoccupied land create huge challenges 
for conservationists (e.g., Joppa et  al. 2009, Laurance et  al. 
2014), especially when migrants settle in remote areas of 
low population density surrounding protected areas, as in 
Tanzania (Salerno et al. 2014) and other steppe and savan-
nah locations. Where such migrants bring with them tradi-
tions for dealing with human–wildlife conflict, such as the 
retaliatory killing of lions (Panthera leo), tensions with pro-
tected area managers quickly develop. To address this perva-
sive problem across Africa, new approaches to conservation 
interventions and funding are needed. Although multiple 
approaches to reducing human–wildlife conflict are being 
tried (box 1), we report in the present article on the use of a 
hitherto unexplored community-driven means of conserv-
ing lions, the establishment of village bylaws, and its role in 
contributing to conservation success. In addition, and con-
troversially, we question the appropriateness of the metrics 
of success that conservation funders increasingly require.
All of East Africa’s principal protected areas still contain-
ing lions are surrounded by pastoral communities (table 1; 
see also Bauer and Van Der Merwe 2004 for West Africa), 
and human–wildlife conflict is rife. In addition, lion killing 
for material rewards and prestige, so deeply engrained in 
traditional culture (Wilson 1953, Spencer 1988), remains 
pervasive (Hazzah et al. 2009, Dickman et al. 2011, Eustace 
and Tarimo 2019), making community-focused interven-
tions essential. In the present article, we examine a novel 
grassroots strategy to reduce illegal lion killing among such 
populations, focusing on an ethnic group (Sukuma; see 
box 2) that has recently expanded to almost every region 
of Tanzania (Salerno et  al. 2017). The implications of this 
investigation into how to stop lion killing form a case study 
in how to reduce human–wildlife conflict involving danger-
ous predators (Woodroffe et al. 2005).
We introduce the novel strategy of supporting a com-
munity initiative to establish bylaws that ban the killing of 
lions and rewarding of lion killers. Bylaws (sensu stricto) for 
conservation are typically deployed in industrial nations to 
solve landscape and urban planning dilemmas (Hawkins 
2014, Curran et  al. 2016), but within developing nations, 
their use is primarily limited to the participatory forestry 
sector (e.g., Khatun et al. 2017). Indeed, despite widespread 
support among international conservation organizations for 
community-based conservation, there is little acknowledge-
ment that local conservationists (who these organizations 
empower) themselves need institutional means of further-
ing their objectives. Bylaw establishment offers an effective 
bottom-up community-driven institutional process that can 
change behavior and attitudes, as we will show.
Most strategies designed to reduce human–carnivore 
conflict demand continuous external funding (Dickman 
et al. 2011), but success in the funding arena rightly requires 
rigorous evaluation of project outcomes (Sutherland et  al. 
2004). Evaluation, most effective when conducted by inde-
pendent parties, is expensive, however. In addition, it can 
AQ1
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bioscience/article-abstract/69/12/1008/5606896 by U
niversity Library user on 12 D
ecem
ber 2019
Forum
https://academic.oup.com/bioscience  December 2019 / Vol. 69 No. 12 • BioScience   1009 
impose considerable burdens on both interviewed house-
holds and project personnel, because, to be useful, it must 
cover multiple aspects of people’s lives potentially affected 
by the intervention (Woodhouse et al. 2015, Brooks 2017). 
Without extensive and transparent discussions of realistic 
metrics between conservation funding organizations and 
their donors, local organizations now face daunting chal-
lenges in providing independently collected and sufficiently 
broad evidence-based success metrics when applying for 
renewed funding (Baylis et al. 2016).
Using village bylaws to limit lion killing
A novel approach to reducing negative impacts of humans 
on lions lies in the grassroots implementation of village 
bylaws that prohibit lion killing. The WASIMA cam-
paign (Watu, Simba, na Mazingira, “People, Lions, and 
Environment”) focused on establishing such bylaws at a 
site (Mpimbwe District) adjacent to Tanzania’s third largest 
national park, Katavi (KNP) and the Rukwa Game Reserve 
(RGR). WASIMA is predicated on the assumption that 
locally driven institutional change (bylaws) could influence 
Box 1. Strategies to reduce human–lion conflict.
Free-ranging African lions are perceived as problems by pastoralists (Woodroffe et al. 2005, Riggio et al. 2013) because lions threaten 
livestock and humans; indeed, predator depredation can amount to two-thirds of a household’s annual cash income (e.g., Holmern 
et al. 2007). Consequently, killing lions in retaliation for livestock loss is commonplace in many parts of the lion’s range (Ogada et al. 
2003, Holmern et al. 2007, Hazzah et al. 2009, Dickman et al. 2014, Hazzah et al. 2017), and retaliators garner significant economic and 
cultural rewards among human populations that rely heavily on livestock (e.g., Fitzherbert et al. 2014). In the face of this human–lion 
conflict, various approaches encourage coexistence between people and predators (Dickman et al. 2011). These include compensation 
for livestock losses (Maclennan et al. 2009, Bauer et al. 2017), safer husbandry practices (Ogada et al. 2003, Kissui 2008, Lichtenfeld 
et al. 2014), individual lion protection (Hazzah et al. 2014), fencing (albeit contraversially; Packer et al. 2013), setting up community 
conservancies whereby income from tourism replaces that from livestock (Blackburn et al. 2016), and village bylaw implementation 
(e.g., the present study).
Figure 1. Male lion feasting of a dead hippopotamus in Katavi National Park with crocodiles in attendance (photo 
Tim Caro).
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lion numbers by shifting the cost:benefit ratio of killing 
lions. The theory of change (White 2009) underlying this 
campaign is that attitudes and practices surrounding lion 
killing would change as a result of new bylaws making illegal 
both the visits of lion dancers to Mpimbwe and the material 
rewards of their feats of courage.
Sukuma began arriving in Mpimbwe in the mid 1970s, 
bringing with them the cultural practice of killing lions 
that endanger people and their livestock and rewarding lion 
dancers for their bravery in protecting the common good 
(box 2). Capitalizing on evidence that householders were tir-
ing of rewarding lion killers who increasingly seek trophies 
inside the national park (Fitzherbert et al. 2014), WASIMA 
project staff, with local input, adopted the use of bylaws. 
First, they introduce the idea informally in a village, work-
ing closely with a motivated core group of individuals. Next, 
a draft bill goes to the village natural resource committee 
(figure 3) and, finally, to a full village assembly. If accepted, 
the bill moves to the district council. After approval, train-
ing is conducted with the Sungusungu, a grassroots and 
strongly locally endorsed policing organization (Paciotti and 
Borgerhoff Mulder 2004). At these training workshops, the 
political, legal, and social aspects of implementing bylaws 
within the framework of state law are fully discussed, work-
ing from a manual designed by WASIMA’s first project 
manager (PG) in conjunction with Sungusungu and local 
government leaders. Additional ancillary WASIMA cam-
paign activities accompany bylaw motivation events and 
include environmental film showings, tours for students 
and village leaders into KNP, tree planting programs, and 
wildlife clubs. WASIMA currently operates in 22 villages 
across Mpimbwe District (Katavi Region), with bylaws 
fully adopted in 18 villages and with another 4 currently 
approaching ratification.
Assessing impact. To determine the effectiveness of this inter-
vention on perceptions of lion killing, the results of a house-
hold survey (n = 150) conducted in 2010 in Mpimbwe were 
compared with a second crowd-funded survey (n = 212) 
conducted in August 2016 and February 2017, using iden-
tical methods and survey instruments. The second survey 
identified a parallel sample to that of the original survey: 
rural Sukuma households scattered across a growing number 
of subvillages on the flood plains adjacent to the  protected 
areas (see the supplement 1).
In answer to a question regarding how often the inter-
viewee sees lion dancers in Mpimbwe these days (supple-
ment 2), the percentages of respondents answering “often” 
changed from 43% to 3%, and those answering “never” from 
10% to 60%. Asking more specifically about lion dancers’ vis-
its to the interviewee’s household since 2005 (n = 132 dancer 
visits), 75 of 97 (77%) of the visits were reportedly rewarded 
in the first survey, but only 18 out of 35 (51%) in the sec-
ond survey (χ2 = 7.88, df = 1, p < .01; figure 4). Although 
almost half of the visits were still rewarded, the payment 
components changed over time (χ2 = 10.39, df = 2, p < .005, 
n = 93 rewarded visits). Most notably, the highly preferred 
gift (cattle or multiple sheep or goats) declined from 44% to 
11% of all rewarded visits between the first and second sur-
veys, whereas the presentation of small gifts (nominal cash 
payments or a hen) increased from 11% to 39%.
Turning to attitudes, the interviewees’ responses to 
hypothetical lion killing by their sons have changed since 
WASIMA began. Household heads claim to be far less tol-
erant of killings both adjacent to Sukuma settlements and 
inside the protected areas (figure 5); a father’s approval is 
critically important in highly gerontocratic pastoralist soci-
eties, where sons depend heavily on their fathers for access 
to land and livestock.
Table 1. Principal protected areas in East Africa containing lions and the primarily pastoralist populations living 
adjacent to these areas.
Kenya Tanzania Uganda
Protected area Adjacent population Protected area Adjacent population Protected area Adjacent population
Aberdare NP Maasai Katavi NP Sukuma Kidepo NP Karimajong
Amboseli NP Maasai Lake Manyara NP Maasai Murchison Falls NP Karimajong
Lake Nakuru NP Maasai Mahale Mountains NP Sukuma Queen Elizabeth NP Nyankole, Hima
Masai-Mara NR Maasai Mikumi NP Barabaig, Maasai
Meru NP Borana and others Mkomazi NP Maasai
Nairobi NP Maasai Ngorongoro CA Maasai
Tsavo East NP Maasai, Orma Ruaha NP Barabaig, Maasai, Sukuma
Tsavo West NP Maasai Saadani NP Barabaig, Maasai, Sukuma
Selous GR Maasai
Serengeti NP Maasai
Tarangire NP Maasai
Udzungwa NP Sukuma
Note: The data are from various sources, primarily Enghoff (1990) and Homewood (1995). Abbreviation: CA, conservation area; GR, game reserve; 
NP, national park; NR, nature reserve.
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Box 2. Sukuma and lions: An uneasy relationship.
Sukuma communities arrived in Mpimbwe in the mid-1970s after abandoning their heavily degraded homelands in northern 
Tanzania (Galaty 1988). As agropastoralists, they typically settle on seasonal flood plains for rice cultivation and keep large herds 
of cattle and small stock. Human–wildlife—and, particularly, human–carnivore—conflict occurs across much of their range, 
promoting a cultural practice of retaliatory lion killing. According to Sukuma contemporary practice, a lion killer has informal 
license to visit the households of relatives and clan members, both in their own neighborhood and in other regions of the coun-
try, perform a traditional lion dance, and demand rewards (livestock or cash) for both bravery and ridding the community of a 
predator.
Research conducted in 2010–2011 in Sukuma communities bordering KNP and RGR showed that the cultural practice of lion killing 
had altered in response to new conditions in which livestock depredation was no longer a problem. In Mpimbwe, the retaliatory killing 
of lions that attack livestock on village lands (by “avengers”) was being been replaced by the pursuit of lions within the national park 
(by “hunters”; Fitzherbert et al. 2014). From Mpimbwe, Sukuma men were increasingly entering protected areas to kill lions for profit. 
Because lions are now, in this part of Tanzania, rarely encountered outside protected areas and pose little threat to livestock, Fitzherbert 
and colleagues (2014) concluded that lion killing is now driven by the attraction of financial and reputational awards rather than the 
protection of livestock.
In interviews in 2010, many householders conveyed dismay at this shift in Sukuma custom (Fitzherbert et  al. 2014). Wafeki 
(Ki-Swinglish for “cheater” or “faker”) had become a common epithet for men who hunt lions in a protected area and then dance as if 
they had provided a public good. Accordingly, a grassroots campaign, WASIMA (for Watu, Simba, na Mazingira; in Kiswahili, “People, 
Lions, and the Environment”) was established in 2011 to halt the prevalence and the spread of lion killing in Mpimbwe (Genda et al. 
2012), a heavily human dominated landscape (Caro 1999).
Figure 2. Lion dancer visiting a household. Photograph: 
Emmanuel Stephens. 
How many lions were saved? Of the 132 dancer visits, 105 (80%) 
involved killings in KNP and RGR (areas not differentiated 
by Sukuma and referred to in the present article as Katavi); 
the remaining 20% of killings occurred in other western and 
central regions of the country; some Sukuma lion dancers 
travel far to celebrate their feat. We determined that the 
visits from lion dancers represented the deaths of between 
55 and 72 Katavi lions (using the lower and upper bounds 
of independence, table 2). To identify the change in lion kill-
ings between 2005–2010 and 2011–2016, the same analysis 
was conducted on visits recorded in the 5 full years preced-
ing each survey. We recorded that 42–55 lions were killed in 
Katavi between 2005 and 2010 (inclusive) and 13–17 lions 
between 2011 and 2016 (table 2), representing a decline of 
59%–69%. Put another way, the number of lions saved dur-
ing the WASIMA campaign (2011–2016) lies between 29 
and 38 individuals (or 4.8–6.3 lions per year over 6 years). 
On the basis of the only accurate estimate of lions ever made 
in KNP (Kiffner et al. 2009), that gave a figure of 168 (range, 
77–439) lions in 2005; this represents 2.9%–3.8% of the 2005 
lion population saved per year (table 2).
What have we learned?
In this study, we used a before and after design to show a 
major decline in reported lion killing and lion dancing in 
Mpimbwe and in social approval of the lion killing tradition, 
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which resulted in saving an estimated 29–38 individual lions 
between 2011 and 2016. These changes are coterminous with 
the establishment of the WASIMA campaign and likely con-
tingent on the institution of bylaws and associated WASIMA 
activities. Because of both widespread internal migration 
of people across remoter areas of Tanzania (Salerno et  al. 
2014) and the continuing prevalence of human–lion conflict 
where (agro)pastoral populations live adjacent to protected 
areas (Salerno et al. 2017), these results are of considerable 
relevance to East Africa and beyond. We recognize the limi-
tations of relying on reported data and of estimating demo-
graphic outcomes from lion dancer visits (both discussed 
below), but we use this apparent success story to reflect on 
the broader challenges and opportunities facing community 
organizations in evaluating their performance according to 
the metrics of international funders. These include the dif-
ficulty in counting lions saved; the tricky dynamics among 
the behavioral, attitudinal, and ecological impacts of their 
programs; and the challenge of convincing donors of the role 
of bylaws in institutionalizing conservation objectives.
Difficulties in counting lions saved. Increasingly and for good 
reason (Sutherland et  al. 2004), funders ask programs 
that are designed to ameliorate human–wildlife conflict to 
provide measures of success. They often request a precise 
estimate of the effect of the program on the target species’ 
numbers, effectively asking, “How many individuals has 
your initiative saved?”
To be credible, such estimates require not only accu-
rate independent data on overall population trends in the 
target species but also careful apportionment of (often 
multiple) causes of population change. Regarding the first, 
for WASIMA, this would entail comparing the current 
population of lions in KNP to that estimated in 2005 by 
Kiffner and colleagues (2009) to see if there has been an 
increase in the population coterminous with the founding 
of WASIMA. This was not feasible because of a delayed 
nationwide lion census and a more general political sensitiv-
ity to counting species classed as “vulnerable” (Riggio et al. 
2013). Furthermore, such a donor-demanded census, had it 
occurred, could still not unequivocally attribute a change in 
lion numbers to WASIMA’s actions.
This is because ascribing population changes to particular 
ecological and social drivers demands intensive research on 
prey populations, disease, and rainfall, as well as on anthro-
pogenic drivers, including habitat fragmentation and differ-
ent forms of exploitation acting simultaneously, and even 
the best studies (e.g., Blackburn et al. 2016) rely in part on 
Figure 3. WASIMA staff facilitating a village council meeting in Mpimbwe. Photograph: Jonathan Kwiyega 
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inferences. With respect to the current case, lions are killed 
by expatriate hunters (Packer et al. 2011, Nelson et al. 2013) 
in five hunting blocks that surround KNP (Caro 2008), but 
there is no accurate picture yet of the relative importance of 
illegal and legal hunting of lions in Tanzania. Obtaining lion 
legal offtake records from local and central government is 
often difficult (Riggio et al. 2016), and, coupled with a reti-
cence about conducting lion surveys nationally, the overall 
significance of changes in local hunting pressure are hard to 
assess. Furthermore, a declining prey base within KNP may 
also be exerting an effect (Caro 2008), mirroring that occur-
ring throughout the lion’s range (Sandom et al. 2017). The 
data-intensive investigations required to unpack the precise 
impact of a community initiative such as WASIMA are far 
beyond the scope and capacity of most grassroots conserva-
tion projects.
As an alternative to focusing on the population dynam-
ics of predators, conservationists can use more directly 
measured outcomes. For example, interventions focused 
on good husbandry quantify reductions in lion attacks on 
livestock (Ogada et  al. 2003, Kissui 2008, Lichtenfeld et  al. 
2014), or experience of livestock depredation can influence 
individual propensities toward lion killing (Hazzah et  al. 
2009). Some programs track the number of lions killed. For 
example, on a southern Kenyan “group ranch,” compensa-
tion combined with a broader set of interventions incentiv-
izing lion conservation is associated, most likely causally, 
with an extraordinary 99% decline in the number of lions 
killed (Hazzah et  al. 2014) and, simi-
larly, an 80% decline around Tanzania’s 
Ruaha National Park (www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-40261039). Although 
such measures offer, in one sense, a gold 
standard, it is of course possible that 
individuals inclined to kill lions hunt 
elsewhere (an issue of leakage we address 
below), such that inferences to overall 
lion numbers are still problematic.
WASIMA cannot directly count the 
number of lions killed, because these 
events occur deep inside the national 
park and game reserve, but they can 
make estimates on the basis of lion 
dancer visits. This method has limita-
tions. First, there are exogenous rea-
sons that estimates may be biased 
up (or down) in both surveys (see 
table 2). Second, the data are based on 
recalled visits of lion dancers; the num-
ber of visits may be inflated because of 
their saliency or, alternatively, may be 
forgotten or concealed. Third, illegal 
lion killing may be underreported to 
the second survey enumerators, who 
were (albeit indirectly) associated with 
WASIMA, although insofar as the first 
survey was conducted by an expatriate researcher (EF) 
working with a broader long-term conservation activities 
in the area (Borgerhoff Mulder et  al. 2007), an under-
reporting bias might be expected there too. We raise the 
relationship between independent evaluation and fund-
ing later.
In short, when grassroots lion conservation program 
managers are asked to show (e.g., on funding application 
forms) how many lions they have saved, they should ide-
ally conduct fully controlled before and after studies with 
counterfactuals to accurately infer causality (e.g., Ferraro 
et  al. 2019). This is rarely feasible for small organizations. 
Insistence on this point will stifle—and even halt—many 
worthwhile local conservation initiatives.
Collaborative development of appropriate metrics of success. Our 
experiences with identifying metrics of success for WASIMA 
highlight the need for what Baylis and colleagues (2016) 
called “mainstreaming” project evaluation through long-
term partnerships between funders and projects in both the 
design and funding of interventions. We encourage this for 
several reasons.
First, in considering the shortcomings of our estimates of 
lions saved, we recognize that not all men who kill lions in 
Katavi dance in Mpimbwe. Indeed, it is quite possible that 
lion killers leave Mpimbwe to dance elsewhere. This is a 
classic spillover dynamic, often referred to as leakage (Baylis 
et al. 2016). It is, effectively, the displacement of unwanted 
Figure 4. The distribution of visits made by lion dancers since 2005, and the 
proportion of those visits rewarded with different gifts, based on 5-year recall 
in 2010 and 2016–2017 surveys (n = 132). WASIMA was initiated in 2011 and 
became fully active in 2012.
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behavior elsewhere, and indeed, project managers often hear 
that lion killers now fear dancing in Mpimbwe because of 
contravening village bylaws. This is undoubtedly a problem 
for the estimate of lions saved (effectively overestimating the 
metric of success). However, at the same time, it is, ironically, 
a sign of the success of the WASIMA campaign and provides 
a strong rationale for expanding the program across adja-
cent Sukuma-dominated areas, such that dancing no longer 
becomes an option anywhere, thereby avoiding leakage and 
rather promoting what has been called a “halo” effect (Baylis 
et al. 2016). This raises the question of how much attention 
funders should pay to the number of lions saved as opposed 
to alternate impact metrics of novel institutions.
Second, conservation interventions must operate on mul-
tiple scales. The estimated 29–38 lions saved represent the 
reduced hunting pressure only from Mpimbwe, lying to the 
south of Katavi. To the north of the protected areas lie tradi-
tional lands of the WaBende and, to the east, the WaKonongo 
(Mgawe et al. 2013); both zones are now heavily populated 
by Sukuma migrants (whose settlements are now also per-
manent, Salerno 2016). Because there is no evidence that 
Sukuma youth in those areas have reduced their customary 
lion killing, the impact of illegal lion killing may be consid-
erably greater than estimated in the present article. Funders, 
in collaboration with local communities, should consider 
whether funds are better spent evaluating local success for 
lion numbers or expanding bylaw adoption elsewhere. Are 
funders willing to consider that leakage is sometimes best 
countered through promoting institutional halos around 
successful interventions, effectively scaling up their interven-
tion (e.g., Andrews and Borgerhoff Mulder 2018)?
Third, funders typically support only activities directly 
related to stopping lion killing, not longitudinal ecological 
and social monitoring. Organizations such as WASIMA 
must therefore turn to crowd-funding platforms. In this 
particular case, evaluation was facilitated through links 
to a US academic institution (and a secondary network of 
conservation-minded donors)—an advantage unfortunately 
largely unavailable to most local conservation organizations. 
A related problem is that, even if funders are willing to sup-
port evaluation, resources are rarely sufficient for hiring 
independent personnel. The WASIMA surveys were not 
entirely independent (see supplement 1), raising important 
credibility issues for community-based grassroots organiza-
tions that clearly worry funders.
Finally, although no funding agency has raised this issue, 
WASIMA recognizes that dismissing the cultural value of 
virtuoso lion dance performances would be counterproduc-
tive. Projects should be evaluated on multiple criteria, not 
least cultural integrity. Campaigns should be balanced with 
programs that encourage maintenance of (dance) traditions, 
similar to the emphasis on cultural continuity in a com-
parable grassroots program in Kenya (Hazzah et  al. 2009, 
Dolrenry et al. 2016). Other examples already exist in Africa, 
such as PANTHERA’s promotion of fake leopard skins in 
Zulu cultural dancing.
Figure 5. Attitudes toward the killing of lions within (a) the community and (b) the national park as compared between 
before and after WASIMA that started in 2011. (χ2 = 33.68, df = 1, p < .001, n = 338; χ2 = 13.44, df = 1, p < .01, n = 341, 
respectively).
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We have raised several thorny conservation issues. First, 
what is the appropriate relationship between behavioral 
or attitudinal measures of change (negative views on a 
lion-killing son, reduced gifts for dancers) and ecologi-
cal outcomes (number of lions saved)? Should the latter 
necessarily take precedence? Second, what to do when 
the institutional success of a campaign such as WASIMA 
may have driven the behavior undercover and may there-
fore have interfered with more standard measurements of 
success (in this case, the frequency of lion dancer visits)? 
The very fact the behavior might be hidden to other com-
munity members (including researchers) actually points to 
an important norm change! Third, how to deal with scalar 
effects in success metrics? Campaigns that successfully 
change peoples’ attitudes have within them, when there is 
leakage of conservation actions beyond the project area, the 
very seeds of their own expansion or destruction (Baylis 
et  al. 2016). If WASIMA in Mpimbwe is prompting lion 
killers to dance elsewhere, WASIMA must be extended to 
adjacent areas. Consequently, donors need to consider far 
more carefully whether evaluation funds might be better 
spent focusing on appropriate metrics and examining what 
is going on outside of the project area for both positive and 
negative spillover effects; this is particularly important for 
wide-ranging target species.
Ultimately, funders demanding evidence-based evalua-
tions should recognize the financial and logistic challenges 
in conducting those evaluations and should think beyond 
simplistic endpoints. Clearly, there is no one size fits all 
solution, such as the number of individual animals saved. 
As was recently concluded by Blackburn and colleagues 
(2016), changing human perceptions and attitudes toward 
lions most likely play a key role in successful conservation 
outcomes in Kenya’s Masai Mara, even though the authors 
were unable to measure this. WASIMA, on the other hand, 
chose to measure attitudes but not outcomes, but these too 
would be considered as clear flags of success in any theory of 
change (White 2009). Indeed, as Cowling (2014) implored, 
as conservationists, “let’s get serious about human behavior” 
(see also Hazzah et al. 2017).
Bylaws as keys to success. As was noted above, WASIMA’s 
theory of change lies in the assumption that attitudes and 
practices regarding lion killing and lion dancing would 
change as a result of shifts in the cost:benefit ratio of lion 
killing and lion dancing contingent on new bylaws. At a 
superficial level, the intervention has worked. There has 
been an apparent increase in disapproval among household 
heads of lion killing by their sons, a reported reduction 
in rewarding lion dancers, and a substantial drop in the 
number of lion dancers reported visiting households. It is 
unlikely that this results from reduced conflict with lions, 
because the levels of livestock depredation were very low in 
both surveys (4% and 3%, respectively). (Also, if attitudinal 
change simply tracked declining incidences of human–
wildlife conflict, we would expect only a reduction in 
tolerance of sons killing as “avengers” and not as “hunters,” 
but this was not the case.) WASIMA staff sense bylaws are 
working as deterrents rather than punishments. For exam-
ple, village governments working with the Sungusungu 
exert fines of 100,000 TSh (US$45) for infringements but 
rarely now encounter dancers. Notably, in 2016, villagers 
informed on an incident of 10 youths planning to hunt 
lions inside KNP.
How can all these changes be explained? We look briefly 
at this question from the perspective of householders, poten-
tial lion killers, and, finally, the communities accepting new 
bylaws to determine broader lessons for lion conservation in 
areas dominated by pastoralists with lion killing traditions, 
as are found particularly in East Africa.
Table 2. Lion dancers’ visits to households in Mpimbwe between 2005–2016, where the location of incident was 
identified as “Katavi.”
Proportion of visits judged independenta Estimated number of lions killed
Date Lion dancer visits
Lower bound (less 
stringent estimate)
Upper bound (more 
stringent estimate) Lower bound Upper bound
2005–2010 75 0.723 0.560 55 42
2011–2016b 22 0.773 0.591 17 13
2005–2016 97 0.742 0.567 72 55
aTo determine number of lions saved, the independence of 97 cases where households reported a visit from a dancer who announced having 
killed a lion in “Katavi” must be established. Using two sources of data—year of reported visit and place of origin of the dancer—lower and 
upper bounds of independence were identified. Lower-bounded (or less stringent) independence was determined for paired records with shared 
year and shared place of dancer’s origin; in other words, if dancer from the same area of origin danced in multiple households in 2008 he was 
considered as a single case (one lion killed). Using this method for the full set of observations (n = 97) yielded a judgement that 74% of lion 
dancer visits were made by independent dancers celebrating distinct incidences, or 72 killings. Higher-bounded independence was determined 
more stringently, insofar as adjacent years were considered as equivalent (i.e., the same year), perhaps reasonable given that many Sukuma 
estimate the passing of a year on an agricultural rather than a Julian calendar; therefore, dancers from the same place of origin dancing in 
2008 and 2009 were considered as a single case (one lion killed); this yielded an estimate of 55 independent killings for the full sample 
of observations. The estimates of number of lions killed may be overestimated if lion killers are “sharing” spoils with others (for profit), or 
underestimated if lions are being killed for purposes other than dancing—for example, to provide traditional medicines both within Africa and 
internationally (Riggio et al. 2013). (We assume, following ethnographic reports, that lions are killed by a single hunter or dancer).
bThere are two reasons our comparisons in the text are conservative with respect to inferring the effects of WASIMA: The first survey captures 
68 months retrospectively, the second 68–74 months, and WASIMA was not fully implemented until midyear 2012.
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Precipitating factors that have motivated Sukuma 
 householders—typically elders—to first suggest and later 
embrace the goals of WASIMA likely include resentment 
of the financial gains being made, not only by the wafeki 
themselves but also the local doctors (waganga), who report-
edly sell lion body parts delivered to them by lion killers 
in exchange for potions. Also likely important was “gifting 
fatigue” (Fitzherbert et  al. 2014) and annoyance among 
householders who see lion dancers as no longer providing 
a public good but simply private benefits. In their words, 
dancers are “stealing twice, once from us [through our gifts] 
and once from KNP” (village meeting August 2014). Finally, 
Sungusungu support was critical, given their respected status 
in Mpimbwe (Paciotti et al. 2005).
Turning to lion dancers, the anticipation of smaller (or 
no) gifts or of the threat of censure or fines clearly reduces 
the motivation both to kill lions and to dance in Mpimbwe. 
The logic in the present article seems straightforward, inso-
far as the costs of lion hunting have increased (because of 
WASIMA fines) and the benefits declined.
What is more puzzling is why the people of Mpimbwe, 
in their various roles as members of village assemblies, 
recipients of dancer visits, or potential victims of lion attacks 
agree to bylaws at all. There are three possibilities. First, 
community members might perceive increased benefits 
from conserving lions. Tourism is commonly identified as 
a source of compensation, but in Mpimbwe, there are effec-
tively no significant financial benefits to local communities 
from lion conservation. Tourism is restricted to luxury 
camps, typically staffed by personnel from other regions and 
supplied by air; furthermore, employment opportunities in 
KNP are meager. Second, perhaps project interventions have 
shifted wildlife values through WASIMA’s ancillary activi-
ties? These, however, are, as yet, quite limited. Consistent 
with Dickman and colleagues (2011), we note that resources 
devoted to alternative livelihood programs or other induce-
ments for coexistence with predators are inadequate. In 
short, there are no perceived benefits to living with lions. 
Furthermore, although the costs are currently low (cases of 
cattle depredation are rare; Fitzherbert et al. 2014) these may 
climb as populations grow (Salerno et al. 2017) and herders 
seek pasture inside of protected areas, thereby exposing their 
livestock to greater risks of predation.
A third possibility is that people want to develop their 
own regulations regarding their interactions with wildlife 
after a history of top-down state-led initiatives. The people 
of Mpimbwe, as in some other parts of East Africa, have suf-
fered harassment from centralized law enforcement; most 
recently, they were relocated with the expansion of KNP in 
1998 (Borgerhoff Mulder et  al. 2007) and targeted by vio-
lence (in the Tokomeza campaign’s burning of their houses; 
Salerno et al. 2017). It is just possible that these grievances 
stimulated grassroots action.
In summary, we cannot pinpoint exactly why com-
munities in Mpimbwe were open to the adoption of 
bylaws, but we have some suggestions that may guide 
initiatives elsewhere in Africa where human–wildlife con-
flicts abound (Woodroffe et al. 2005). First, heterogeneity 
within communities with respect to support of the custom 
of lion killing can be profitably leveraged without infring-
ing on individual rights. Second, local institutions must be 
involved from the very start in both the design and imple-
mentation stages (as was shown to be important globally; 
Brooks et al. 2012). Third, given that benefits from tourism 
may be a vain hope (at least in the short term), alterna-
tive stabilizing institutional mechanisms, such as mutually 
agreed on fines, are needed. Locally initiated bylaws may 
not be a panacea, but they are worth considering more 
broadly, if local activists are to be empowered. In short, 
conservationists should encourage the endogenous emer-
gence of institutions.
Conclusions
Internal migration in Tanzania is heaviest in areas with 
lower (preexisting) population densities, areas that typi-
cally lie close to protected areas (Salerno et al. 2014) and 
that are the focus of the Sukuma expansion of the last 40 
years (Salerno et  al. 2017). Lion-killing traditions cause 
considerable lion population offtake (between 55 and 72 
individuals in KNP since 2005). Bylaws, in conjunction 
with ancillary educational and entertainment activities, 
offer effective tools to reduce illegal lion killing, as is 
evidenced in the present article. This has implications 
for national strategy, especially in East Africa but poten-
tially wherever retaliatory killing occurs. Interestingly, 
although there is some use of village bylaws in the par-
ticipatory forestry sector, we are not aware of this as 
conservation strategy for wildlife. There is a tendency to 
glamorize community-based conservation, but commu-
nities are not single-willed entities (Agrawal 1997). The 
conservation-orientated community members that outside 
nongovernmental organizations attract (and empower) 
need institutional means (such as bylaws) of furthering 
their objectives. Establishing bylaws has proved a novel 
(as far as we know) and effective (as we have shown) solu-
tion. Furthermore, bylaws are not, by definition, top-down 
impositions—a strategy so contested in the conservation 
literature—but promote self-regulation.
Ongoing grassroots initiatives require basic operating 
costs and, therefore, donor support, necessitating the evalu-
ation of outcomes and impacts. This can be problematic 
for small organizations with limited budgets, unable to 
outsource the process to an independent agent; WASIMA’s 
evaluation was supported entirely through crowd funding. 
With social media and a few well-connected friends, this 
might prove appropriate for small organizations in the devel-
oping world that do not, at least in their early years, have the 
human capital to apply for large conservation grants.
Conventional standards of success dictated by Western 
donor organizations may be inappropriate or may, at least, 
distract attention from other meaningful indices. Project 
managers, evaluators, conservation funders, and (most 
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importantly) their donors need to enter into construc-
tive dialog over appropriate indices of success. They must 
consider the relative merits of monitoring developments 
inside and outside protected areas; determine how to 
weight attitudinal, behavioral, and ecological measures 
as informative flags of success; and recognize the consid-
erable financial and logistic constraints that grassroots 
programs face.
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